South China Sea: Regional Rivals Emulate China’s Island Building, Raising Legal and Security Questions

In the waning years of the second decade of the twenty‑first century, the People’s Republic of China, having completed a series of extensive artificial‑island projects upon disputed reefs and shoals within the South China Sea, proceeded to install a constellation of airstrips, missile batteries, and logistical facilities that together constitute a de‑facto militarised archipelago contrary to the spirit of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Observing this unprecedented accumulation of material power, a cadre of regional claimants, most prominently the Republic of the Philippines, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei, have in recent months embarked upon modest yet symbolically potent programmes of construction and reinforcement upon their own contested features, thereby signalling a reluctant acceptance that the doctrine of “grab what you can while you can” now permeates their strategic calculations. Nevertheless, the aggregate outcome of these parallel endeavours has not merely altered the topographic complexion of the contested maritime expanse, but has also introduced a multiplicity of new flashpoints wherein the overlapping claims of sovereign states intersect with the operational ambitions of extraregional powers, most conspicuously the United States, which maintains a doctrine of freedom of navigation that now finds itself tested against an increasingly fortified littoral environment.

Formal diplomatic exchanges ensuing from China’s islandisation have been characterised by a persistent dissonance between the declaratory language of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which repeatedly affirms the necessity of a peaceful, law‑based resolution of the South China Sea dispute, and the pragmatic manoeuvres of Beijing, which continues to invoke historical maps and the so‑called ‘nine‑dash line’ to legitimise its expansive jurisdictional claims. Concurrently, the United States, acting under the auspices of its 2016 ‘Free and Open Indo‑Pacific’ strategy, has intensified Freedom of Navigation Operations, dispatching carrier strike groups and surveillance aircraft through waters claimed by all parties, thereby generating a diplomatic choreography that juxtaposes overt naval presence with quiet assurances of support to the Philippines and Vietnam, whose own administrations have struggled to reconcile domestic political imperatives with the constraints imposed by limited defence budgets. Yet the very language of the 2023 ASEAN‑China Joint Statement, which extols the principle of ‘peaceful co‑existence’ while simultaneously reiterating Beijing’s invitation to “mutual respect and cooperation”, has been interpreted by analysts as a diplomatic veneer designed to forestall any immediate escalation, notwithstanding the evident erosion of trust that accompanies each successive episode of reclamation and militarisation.

In the month of May 2026, the Philippine government, invoking a 2024 congressional appropriation earmarked for “reclamation of national maritime assets”, authorized the dredging of an estimated thirty‑four thousand cubic metres of sand around a previously uninhabited outcrop near the contested Reed Bank, a move that has been portrayed domestically as a defensive counter‑measure to the encroaching presence of Chinese installations on nearby Fiery Cross Reef. Simultaneously, Vietnamese naval engineers, under the auspices of a bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence aimed at enhancing “maritime situational awareness”, commenced the erection of a temporary observation post on Loaita Island, employing modular steel structures that, while not constituting full‑scale reclamation, nevertheless mark a tangible assertion of Vietnam’s intent to maintain a physical foothold within the zone deemed essential for the protection of its exclusive economic zone fisheries. Malaysia, too, has disclosed plans to construct a modest research outpost on the submerged Spratly feature known as “Layang‑Layang”, citing the need to monitor climate‑induced coral degradation, yet the timing of the announcement, coinciding with a high‑level Chinese delegation’s visit to Kuala Lumpur, has prompted regional observers to question whether the scientific veneer masks a strategic bid to contest Beijing’s proximity advantage.

The cumulative effect of these nascent construction activities is to render the South China Sea a patchwork of nascent installations whose geopolitical significance far exceeds their modest physical dimensions, thereby heightening the risk that a minor accident—such as a collision between a civilian fishing vessel and a military patrol craft—could trigger a disproportionate escalation, drawing in external powers whose strategic doctrines emphasize forward presence and rapid response. From an economic standpoint, the corridor through which more than twenty‑five percent of global merchant shipping transits now faces a heightened probability of disruption, as insurers recalibrate premiums in response to the perceived escalation of maritime hazards, while energy corporations engaged in offshore hydrocarbon exploration must contend with an increasingly opaque regulatory environment wherein unilateral claims intersect with multilateral negotiations. Strategically, the phenomenon underscores a shift from a previously dominant doctrine of diplomatic deniability towards an overt policy of “pre‑emptive anchoring”, wherein states seek to solidify de‑facto control over disputed maritime features before the conclusions of any final adjudication by international tribunals can be rendered operative, thereby testing the efficacy of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’s dispute‑resolution mechanisms.

For India, whose “Act East” policy envisions a deepening of strategic engagement with the Southeast Asian littoral, the unfolding tableau presents a manifold set of challenges, ranging from the necessity to safeguard the uninterrupted flow of petroleum imports that traverse the Malacca Strait to the imperative of maintaining freedom of navigation for its burgeoning merchant fleet, both of which could be imperilled by a miscalculation among the rival claimants. Furthermore, the Indian Navy, having recently commissioned a new class of stealth frigates equipped with long‑range anti‑ship missiles, has signalled an intent to conduct regular patrols in the eastern Indian Ocean and adjacent South China Sea corridors, a posture that, while intended as a stabilising presence, may be perceived by Beijing as an encroachment upon its self‑declared sphere of influence, thereby injecting an additional layer of diplomatic complexity into an already fraught environment. Consequently, Indian diplomatic channels have been tasked with the delicate exercise of balancing overt support for ASEAN‑wide initiatives promoting a rules‑based order against the pragmatic necessity of avoiding a bilateral confrontation with a neighbour whose economic ties with India remain substantial, a balancing act that epitomises the broader tension between principle and pragmatism in contemporary foreign policy.

The apparent impotence of existing international institutions to curtail the burgeoning construction race can be traced to the ambiguous phrasing of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which obliges members to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, yet offers no explicit prohibition against the peaceful alteration of the physical geography of contested maritime zones. Similarly, the 2016 arbitral award rendered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which unequivocally dismissed China’s historical claims, suffers from an enforcement vacuum, as the United Nations lacks a standing mechanism to compel compliance, leaving largely to the goodwill of the parties and the strategic calculus of great powers whether the award will achieve any substantive effect on the ground. This lacuna has been further exacerbated by Beijing’s assertive narrative that characterises any external criticism as an infringement upon its sovereign prerogatives, a discourse that resonates domestically and is reinforced by state‑controlled media, thereby complicating the task of external actors seeking to rally multilateral opposition without appearing to undermine the principle of non‑intervention.

If the continued erection of modest yet strategically significant structures by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and other regional actors proceeds unabated, does this not expose a fundamental defect in the international community’s capacity to enforce treaty compliance when the very instruments designed to preserve the rule of law are rendered impotent by the absence of any credible sanctioning mechanism? Moreover, should the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea be deemed insufficient to adjudicate disputes that evolve into de‑facto occupations, might the doctrine of freedom of navigation, long championed by the United States and its allies, be compelled to reconceptualise its operational parameters in a manner that reconciles legal principle with the stark realities of a militarised maritime environment? In addition, does the willingness of India to augment its naval presence in proximity to contested features reflect an emergent trend of regional powers employing maritime power projection as a substitute for diplomatic resolution, thereby raising the question of whether such a posture merely postpones conflict or inadvertently escalates the strategic rivalry into a broader great‑power contest?

Finally, can the apparent divergence between the lofty rhetoric of ASEAN’s calls for peaceful coexistence and the tangible steps taken by member states to physically anchor their claims be reconciled without a comprehensive overhaul of the dispute‑resolution architecture, or does it instead signify an implicit acknowledgment that the existing legal framework has been outpaced by geopolitical exigencies? If the pattern of incremental construction persists, will future tribunals possess the requisite jurisdictional authority and practical means to reverse or at least neutralise the material changes on the ground, or will the precedent of unchallenged reclamation irrevocably reshape the legal landscape of maritime sovereignty for generations to come? And, perhaps most critically, should the global community continue to rely on public statements and diplomatic protests as the primary instruments of accountability, can civil societies and affected maritime stakeholders ever hope to verify the veracity of official narratives against observable evidence, or must a new paradigm of transparent, data‑driven monitoring be embraced to bridge the widening chasm between proclamation and practice?

Published: June 3, 2026