Former Indian Western Army Commander Warns Pakistan Will Not Abandon Proxy Warfare, Calls for Sustained Indian Strategic Costs

In a measured briefing delivered to senior officials of the Ministry of Defence and the National Security Advisory Board, former Western Army Commander Lieutenant General Manoj Katiyar asserted that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan continues to regard proxy warfare as an inexpensive yet politically expedient instrument of its strategic calculus, thereby rendering any imminent cessation of such activities highly improbable.

He further contended that India's prevailing calibrated response, largely confined to episodic tactical punitive measures, must evolve into a deliberate strategy imposing sustained economic, diplomatic, and security costs upon the offending state, lest the current equilibrium of low‑intensity confrontation become entrenched as a permanent feature of South Asian security architecture.

In the same exposition, General Katiyar highlighted the increasing salience of perception management through coordinated information operations and cyber domain engagements, insisting that future conflicts will be waged across multiple theatres wherein narrative dominance and digital resilience will prove as decisive as conventional kinetic capabilities.

Such pronouncements inevitably invite scrutiny of India's own policy apparatus, wherein inter‑ministerial coordination, budgetary allocations for cyber‑defence, and legislative oversight of covert operations appear to lag behind the articulated strategic imperatives, thereby exposing a disquieting disparity between declared intent and operational readiness.

Observers within the parliamentary committees on defence and internal security have repeatedly requested comprehensive audits of the mechanisms governing proxy threat mitigation, yet official communiqués continue to emphasize rhetorical fortitude over empirical assessment, a pattern that may engender public skepticism regarding the efficacy of the state's protective promise.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Home Affairs, charged with internal counter‑terrorism coordination, reports incremental successes in dismantling certain transnational militant cells, yet the absence of transparent metrics and publicized case studies renders the claimed progress difficult to verify against the backdrop of recurring cross‑border infiltrations.

Consequently, civil society organisations devoted to human rights and victims' rehabilitation have appealed to the judiciary for stricter enforcement of accountability provisions, contending that without demonstrable linkage between strategic doctrine and field‑level outcomes, the suffering of innocents may be relegated to an auxiliary footnote in official chronicles.

If the strategic briefings by senior military figures emphasize the necessity of imposing enduring financial and diplomatic burdens upon Pakistan, then ought the parliamentary finance committees not insist upon a transparent audit of the projected expenditures, their legal authorisations, and the anticipated return on security investment?

Should the Ministry of Defence's policy drafts, which ostensibly integrate cyber‑information dominance into the broader deterrence framework, be subjected to independent judicial review to ascertain whether the statutory safeguards for civil liberties are adequately embedded, or does the prevailing doctrine tacitly privilege strategic expediency over constitutional fidelity?

In light of recurring reports of cross‑border infiltrations despite proclaimed successes, might the Home Ministry be compelled to disclose, under the Right to Information Act, the exact number of thwarted attempts, the methodology of attribution, and the subsequent legal proceedings, thereby enabling public scrutiny of the claimed efficacy?

Furthermore, does the absence of publicly accessible performance metrics for the multi‑domain deterrence initiatives not betray an implicit assumption that secrecy alone constitutes sufficient accountability, thereby challenging the fundamental premise that democratic governance must be measured against observable outcomes?

Given that the former commander’s insistence on sustained punitive measures hinges upon a calibrated escalation calculus, ought the National Security Council to articulate, in a publicly available doctrine, the precise thresholds at which economic sanctions transition to coercive diplomatic isolation, thus rendering the escalation process subject to democratic oversight?

If the projected multi‑domain conflict scenario envisions simultaneous engagements in cyber, information, and kinetic spheres, should the legislative committees not demand a detailed cost‑benefit analysis that juxtaposes the projected strategic gains against the potential erosion of civil privacy, economic stability, and regional diplomatic goodwill?

Moreover, does the reliance on perceived low‑cost proxy tactics by Pakistan not compel India to reassess its own procurement and research priorities, thereby raising the question of whether the current defence budgeting process adequately incorporates long‑term strategic foresight rather than merely responding to immediate headline threats?

Finally, in the event that the envisioned sustained deterrence fails to achieve measurable compliance, shall the executive branch be held legally answerable for the allocation of public funds to an unverified strategy, or will the doctrine of sovereign discretion continue to shield policy makers from substantive judicial scrutiny?

Published: May 13, 2026

Published: May 13, 2026